UK nationals will lose their EU citizenship status as a result of the Brexit referendum. To prevent this, several commentators, including the European Parliament Brexit negotiator, Guy Verhofstadt, proposed the grant of associate EU citizenship to UK nationals to safeguard their rights as EU citizens after Brexit. We make the case against associate EU citizenship, dismissing it on three grounds. First, it violates the letter and the spirit of EU law: the Treaties make the enjoyment of EU citizenship status contingent on the possession of a Member State nationality and require the Union to respect the rule of law as well as the constitutional traditions of the Member States. Second, it violates core EU values amounting to a tool for the EU to pre-empt vital democratic choices at the national level, thus undermining the established division of powers between the Union and the Member States as well as the effet utile of Article 50 TEU. Third, it is against the EU's interests, as associate EU citizenship fails to respect reciprocity in EU relations with third countries and undermines the coherence of the edifice of EU constitutionalism. Besides being legally unsound he idea of associate EU citizenship thus fails on normative and on pragmatic grounds.
Introduction
The outcome of the UK referendum on continued membership of the EU and the subsequent decision of the UK government to trigger Article 50 TEU and to take the path towards Brexit has produced considerable uncertainty for EU citizens resident within the UK, as well as UK nationals living in the EU. While their future legal position will depend on the outcomes of the negotiations between the UK and the EU, few doubt that Brexit will result in a significant loss of rights on both sides, but especially a significant erosion of the rights of UK citizens.
1 The EU citizenship acquis will not apply in the UK and UK nationals will 
The normative reasons to oppose associate EU citizenship
The idea of associate EU citizenship is also to be rejected on normative grounds. This is because its proponents have not thought through the democratic implications of their
proposals and, what is even more problematic, they seem extremely hostile towards the idea of democratic decision-making. In addition, they are unwilling to respect the competences of the Member States in the EU. The minority argument is couched in such extreme terms that, ostensibly, principles of democratic self-government are rejected altogether. As Stephen Coutts has argued convincingly, the idea that the EU could intervene to "protect" the rights of individuals in the UK that are being dragged from the Union and denied Union citizenship against their will would amount to an argument that the United Kingdom acting under Article 50 TEU is not competent as a democratic political community to bind its own minority. By (seemingly) suggesting that political authority is justifiable only when citizens consent to it, they take a remarkably anarchist position, according to which the authority exercised by political institutions over citizens can be justifiable only when there is unanimous consent. 54 There is no need to engage with that position here, because by taking it, the arguments for associate EU citizenship become self-defeating. It would follow that the UK should never have joined the EU (then EEC) in 1973 in the first place. Not all British citizens consented to membership at that time, 55 so why should a later decision of the UK government bind those UK nationals who never wished EU citizenship or membership?
Of course, there are reasons for concern if democratic decision-making leads to the more-or-less permanent exclusion of insulated minorities, but the threats posed by majoritarian decision-making are being exaggerated. 56 The UK and EU have both expressed the intention to offer substantial safeguards to those who exercised free movement rights previously, indicating that there is considerable awareness of the position of those who (in all likelihood) opposed Brexit. Proponents of associate EU citizenship may favour embracing a substantive version of democracy, which privileges substantive outcomes and a respect for individual rights over procedural concerns and majoritarian decision-making.
However, while democracy presupposes a set of civil-political rights, if pushed to extremes, the determination to privilege substantive outcomes over procedural issues becomes 'a flatly antidemocratic justification for guardianship'.
57
Those who insist on Treaty change before associate EU citizenship can be realised avoid this substantive democracy fallacy, 58 Crucially, such questions in the sphere of EU citizenship cannot possibly arise since it is precisely the citizenship of the Union we are talking about. Not to deprive Article 50 TFEU and the right to national self-determination of any useful effect, the desire to leave the Union and not to be EU citizens should be respected rather than undermined based on a dubious reading of EU citizenship. Associate EU citizenship is to be rejected on that ground.
The various proposals for associate citizenship are also remarkably quiet about processes of democratic decision-making within the EU itself. First, associate EU citizens will not enjoy voting rights in national elections, by virtue of the mere fact that they do not enjoy the nationality of a Member State. 65 Hence, associate EU citizens will be excluded from the EU's indirect channels of political participation, through national elections and the weakening the position held by the proponents of the introduction of such a status.
The pragmatic reasons to oppose associate EU citizenships
Finally, the creation of associate EU citizenship must also be opposed on the ground that it runs counter to the EU's own interests. It fails to respect reciprocity in future relations with the UK, potentially undermining the interests of EU citizens. In addition, it makes the prospect of withdrawal for other countries more attractive and fails to secure fairness in relation with other third-country nationals.
The EU's primary responsibility is towards its own citizens, who could bear the negative consequences of the introduction of associate EU citizenship. District Court succeed and the CJEU decide that EU citizenship (rights) cannot be withdrawn, the EU will find it more difficult to pressure the UK in accepting a fair free movement regime that is beneficial to both sides.
The counter-argument offered by Kostakopoulou is that UK nationals and EU citizens should not be the object of political negotiations. 72 That, however, is not nearly as self-evident as she would want to make us believe. If the Trump administration revokes the visa-waiver programme for EU citizens, or excludes certain Eastern European Member
States from its scope, we think it is desirable that the European Parliament threatens to suspend the programme in order to pressure the US administration to review its decision.
referendum decides that free movement with the EU should be limited, threatening thereby to violate its agreement with the EU, we also think normally that the EU can reconsider its position towards Swiss nationals and terminate their rights. 74 The EU makes these issues of political discussion with the purpose of protecting its own citizens, which should be its primary ambition. In the same way, the EU should primarily be concerned with the rights of its own citizens in Brexit negotiations.
A core difference thus exists between interstate relations within the EU, on the one hand, and between EU Member States (and the Union as a whole) and third countries on the other. Philip Allott treats this as a distinction between 'democracy' and 'diplomacy' in international relations. 'Democracy' implies that collective actions take, as much as possible, the interests of all affected into account. By contrast, 'diplomacy', in Allott's terms, implies acting in the interests of one's own citizens, at the expense of others, if need be. 75 The application of reciprocal measures is limited within the EU, as the prohibition of adopting retaliatory measures indicates. 76 
Conclusion
Seeking to protect that part of the UK citizenry that will be deprived of EU citizenship against their will, if the Treaty text is followed and EU citizenship is treated as a contingent status, additional to Member State nationality, the intentions of those supporting the introduction of associate EU citizenship are easy enough to understand. However, commendable as this may seem, and whatever our disagreements with those supporting Brexit, the appropriate response is not to ignore the Treaties and offer UK nationals EU citizenship in defiance of Article 20 TFEU. Likewise, worries about the loss of rights by UK citizens, which they -and we as EU lawyers -cherish are warranted, but we should neither exaggerate the implications of Brexit, suggesting that everything will be lost, nor in our efforts to seek remedies wholly dismiss democratic values and disregard the EU's wider 
